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Abstract
This paper examines if international trade can reduce total wel-
fare in an international oligopoly with diﬀerentiated goods. We show
that welfare is a U-shaped function in the transport cost as long as
trade occurs in equilibrium. With a Cournot duopoly trade can reduce
welfare compared to autarky for any degree of product diﬀerentiation.
Under Bertrand competition we show that trade may reduce welfare
compared to autarky, if ﬁrms produce suﬃciently close substitutes and
the autarky equilibrium is suﬃciently competitive. Otherwise it can
not.
Keywords: Reciprocal dumping, intra-industry trade, oligopoly,
product diﬀerentiation, transport costs
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1 Introduction
The reciprocal dumping model (Brander, 1981, Brander and Krugman,
1983) shows that competition in quantities à la Cournot in segmented mar-
kets can generate two-way trade in the same good ("reciprocal dumping"),
even though foreign and domestic goods are perfect substitutes. A striking
conclusion from these models is that trade can reduce welfare. For high
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1enough transport costs, the waste of shipping identical goods in both direc-
tions dominates the positive, pro-competitive, eﬀect of trade.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze if this result extends to an inter-
national oligopoly in which ﬁrms produce diﬀerentiated products and com-
pete in prices à la Bertrand. The question is particularly interesting since
we for empirical purposes often think of ﬁrms as setting prices rather than
quantities.1 I ti sa l s oc l e a rt h a ti ti sr a r et h a tg o o d sp r o d u c e db yd i ﬀerent
ﬁrms (let alone in diﬀerent countries) are literally homogenous.2 We ask
the following question: Can international trade reduce total welfare in an
international oligopoly with diﬀerentiated goods and price competition? To
provide a benchmark for this question we also provide an analysis of product
diﬀerentiation when there is Cournot competition.
To the best of our knowledge Clarke and Collie (2003) is the only previ-
ous paper to examine the welfare eﬀects of trade in an international oligopoly
with diﬀerentiated products and price competition.3 They assume that there
are two countries with one ﬁrm in each country. Utility increases in the num-
ber of products. The utility function they use was originally introduced by
Bowley, 1924 (see Martin, 2002, for a discussion). Based on these assump-
tions they establish that trade always increases welfare compared to autarky.
Thus, the welfare result in the Brander-Krugman model, that trade can re-
duce welfare compared to autarky, does not hold for a Bertrand duopoly
with diﬀerentiated goods.
The result in Clark and Collie (2003) is, however, speciﬁc for duopoly.
As our analysis shows, it does not generalize to other market structures.
Allowing for more than one ﬁrm in each country, trade can reduce welfare
compared to autarky in a Bertrand oligopoly as long as there is suﬃcient
competition between domestic producers and goods are suﬃciently close
substitutes. Otherwise it can not.
Let us give the reader some intuition for why the eﬀects of trade may
or may not generalize from the Brander-Krugman setup. The welfare result
presented by Brander and Krugman has two properties. First, welfare falls
1The rapidly expanding literature on competition with diﬀerentiated goods almost
exclusively examines price as the strategic variable (see for instance Goldberg, 1995 or
Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1999). Indeed, in Friberg and Ganslandt (2005) we attempt
to evaluate the welfare eﬀects of trade in bottled water using Bertrand competition in
diﬀerentiated goods.
2The relation between the gains from trade and access to diﬀerentiated varieties has
been the focus of much recent work, see for instance Broda and Weinstein (2004) for an
empirical analysis or Romer (1994) for a theoretical discussion. Indeed already Brander
(1981) concluded by noting that it would be interesting to study two-way trade in similar
goods, and motivated the homogenous goods assumption as a convenient ﬁrst step in
analyzing the broader set of issues.
3It is clear that if ﬁrms compete in prices and goods are perfect substitutes we will
not have reciprocal dumping. Ben-Zvi and Helpman (1992) show that two-way trade in
homogenous goods also fails to emerge if we assume that ﬁrms in a ﬁrst stage determine
capacities and then in a second stage set prices.
2when the trade cost is reduced from the prohibitive level as costly imported
goods replace local production. Second, welfare may be higher in the autarky
equilibrium than in a more competitive trade equilibrium. The former result
is a local property while the latter is global.
Two factors suggest that the result in Brander-Krugman does not neces-
sarily extend beyond quantity competition and product homogeneity. The
ﬁrst signiﬁcant factor is that price competition is more aggressive than quan-
tity competition. The disciplining eﬀect of imports on a sole domestic pro-
ducer is stronger and less resources are wasted in trade to achieve a given
pro-competitive eﬀect. The second signiﬁcant factor is that product diﬀer-
entiation - i.e. variety - has a direct positive eﬀect on welfare since consumer
value access to a greater variety of brands.
Other factors, on the other hand, suggest that trade may reduce welfare
also under price competition. The most important is that entry in a market
with diﬀerentiated products and price competition result in substitution (as
long as the products are not completely independent). The entrant gains
some market share while incumbents loose. Ineﬃcient importation may,
consequently, replace less costly local production. At least in principle, this
opens for the possibility of an ambiguous net eﬀect of international trade.
In this paper we shall therefore analyze how the welfare eﬀects of compe-
tition, trade and love-of-variety interact. Section 2 ﬁrst presents the duopoly
results of Clarke and Collie as a benchmark and goes on to analyze the
diﬀerence between a Cournot and a Bertrand duopoly. The third section
introduces an additional ﬁrm in each country. Section four concludes.
2D u o p o l y
2.1 Bertrand
Consider a model with two ﬁrms and two identical markets (home, denoted
H, and foreign, denoted F). Each ﬁrm produces a symmetric but diﬀerenti-
ated variety of a product demanded in both markets. In autarky each ﬁrm
has a monopoly in its domestic market and does not export to the other
market.4 Markets are segmented. For simplicity focus on the equilibrium
in the home market. Firms compete in a one-shot Bertrand fashion. The
foreign ﬁrm must incur a trade cost, t, per unit transported from the foreign
market to the home market and vice versa. The marginal cost of production
is c for each ﬁrm.
A representative consumer in the home market has the following utility
function
4This is a convenient starting point since the autarchy equilibrium does not depend on
the assumption about Bertrand or Cournot behavior. The welfare level is consequently
the same under autarchy in both models and the diﬀerence between Bertrand and Cournot
competition depends only on the properties of the trade equilibrium.










where qH is the quantity of ﬁrm H’s variety and qF is the quantity of ﬁrm
F’s variety and m is the utility of money. The linear demand functions that
result from utility maximization subject to the budget constraint are given

































(pF − c − t), (3)
with the corresponding ﬁrst order conditions (reaction functions) for the






























The reaction functions are illustrated in Figure 1. The unit trade cost shifts
the reaction curve for the foreign ﬁr mt ot h er i g h t ,i . e .t h et r a d ec o s th a sa
positive eﬀect on the foreign ﬁrm’s price. The trade cost is non prohibitive
as long as the import volume is strictly positive in equilibrium. The set of
possible equilibria with a strictly posi t i v ei m p o r tv o l u m ei st h el i n eb e t w e e n
point F ("free trade") and point B in the ﬁgure. Prices for which imports
are exactly zero is illustrated with qB
F =0 . For trade costs above b t but
below t price is thus given by the bold line connecting points B ("binding
constraint") and A ("autarky"), since, if there is no entry restriction, the
home ﬁrm would set price so as just to keep the foreign ﬁrm’s quantity at
zero. There is, consequently, no trade but the potential for imports still
restricts prices in the domestic market and there is a ﬂavor of limit pricing
to these equilibria. If trade costs are higher still (above t) foreign entry is
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Figure 1. Reaction curves in a Bertrand duopoly
Alternatively, we could model a sequential game where the foreign ﬁrm
ﬁrst takes a decision to enter or stay out of the home market and then,
subject to entry, sets a proﬁt maximizing price in a non-cooperative fash-
ion. The foreign ﬁrm enters market H if the expected proﬁti nt h eN a s h
equilibrium is non-negative. Accordingly, in the sequential game the foreign
ﬁrm enters if t ≤ b t and stays out if t>b t. With a sequential game we would
thus see the domestic price jump from the point B to the unconstrained
monopoly price as trade costs increase above b t.
















We can then compare the welfare at diﬀerent levels of transport costs.
Proposition 1 (Clarke and Collie, 2003). Let utility be given by Eq (1)
with θ ∈ (0,1).L e tﬁrms have constant marginal costs and per unit transport
cost. Assume that there is one ﬁrm from each country and that these ﬁrms
compete à la Bertrand. Then i) a small decrease in trade costs from the
prohibitive level (b t) reduces welfare, ii) welfare is a U-shaped function of
trade costs as long as trade occurs in equilibrium and iii) welfare under
trade is higher than welfare under autarky.
Proof. See appendix A for the relevant welfare expressions. To show i) we
diﬀerentiate the equilibrium welfare level with respect to the trade cost and













which shows that raising the trade cost, t, close to the prohibitive level
increases total welfare. To show ii) note ﬁrst that welfare is higher with free














4 − 3θ2 + θ3¢ > 1.
We can show that W is continuous and strictly convex for trade costs be-
tween free trade and the prohibitive level. It follows that welfare is U-shaped.
To establish iii) note that the quote between the lowest welfare level with









12 + 2θ4 − 9θ2
¶
> 1,
which shows that welfare under autarky is strictly lower than welfare under





2.2 Cournot vs. Bertrand
As we just established, the local welfare result from Brander-Krugman car-
ries over to the case of a Bertrand duopoly with diﬀerentiated goods, while
the global result does not. In particular, the analysis shows that trade in
a Bertrand duopoly can not reduce welfare compared to autarky. Since the
positiveeﬀect of trade is due to a combination of competition and consumers’
love-of-variety, this raises the question whether love-of-variety may possibly
reverse the global welfare result in the Cournot model as well. This sec-
tion accordingly address the following question: Does trade always increase
welfare compared to autarky, if products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated?
For this purpose, we contrast welfare in the Bertrand model with welfare
in the Cournot model. The reaction curves assuming Cournot competition
(but keeping all the other assumptions above) are
qC2
H (qF)=





a − θbqH − c − t
2b
. (8)









(a − c)(2− θ)
2
, (9)
which corresponds to point A ("autarky") in Figure 1 with Bertrand compe-
tition. Contrary to the Bertrand model, we ﬁnd that in the Cournot model
trade can reduce welfare compared to autarky, for any level of product dif-
ferentiation.
Proposition 2 Let utility be given by Eq (1) with θ ∈ (0,1].L e t ﬁrms
have constant marginal costs and per unit transport cost. Assume that there
is one ﬁrm from each country and that these ﬁrms compete à la Cournot.
Then the minimum welfare level with trade is lower than in autarky, for any
degree of product diﬀerentiation.
Proof. Using the equilibrium quantities (7) and (8) we can calculate welfare












which is strictly less than unity for any θ ∈ (0,1].
This is a striking result, to the best of our knowledge new and at ﬁrst
counterintuitive.5 One would have thought that if there is suﬃcient product
diﬀerentiation trade is always welfare improving. As shown that intuition is
not correct - trade can lower welfare as long as demands for products are not
completely independent.6 The intuition for the present result is nevertheless
quite straightforward. At the prohibitive trade cost there is no trade with
foreign varieties. A slight reduction of the transport cost would lead the
foreign ﬁrm to export. This has three eﬀects on welfare. The utility of
consumers in the domestic market is marginally increased by the imports;
the price-adjusted utility of imported goods is marginally higher than the
price-adjusted utility of domestic products. In addition, trade generates a
proﬁtf o rf o r e i g nﬁrms. The margin for traded goods is positive but very
close to zero. The price barely covers the cost when the trade barrier is
close to the prohibitive level. Finally, the substitution away from domestic
goods to imported varieties has a negative eﬀect on proﬁts. Close to a
prohibitive transport cost the margin for domestic goods is strictly positive.
Substitution from domestic products to imports consequently results in a
non-marginal reduction of domestic proﬁts. To sum up, an increased trade
5The closest precursor to the analysis in this section is perhaps Bernhofen (2001) who
examines Cournot competition in diﬀerentiated goods, but focuses on other issues.
6The intuition is correct in the sense though that the more diﬀerentiated that the two
products are, the smaller is the diﬀerence between the autarchy welfare and lowest possible
welfare under trade
7volume reduces welfare close to the prohibitive trade barrier since the only




























Figure 2. Welfare in a Bertrand and Cournot duopoly as a function of
transport costs (a=2, b=1, c=0.5, θ =0 .9)
Figure 2 illustrates how welfare depends on trade costs for the Cournot
and Bertrand case, respectively. It is obvious that the fundamental diﬀer-
ence between the Cournot and the Bertrand duopoly model is not due to
the welfare level in autarky. Instead, the signiﬁcant diﬀerence is due to
the strategic nature of Bertrand and Cournot competition. Moving from
monopoly to duopoly at the prohibitive trade cost in a Cournot model is a
small step. Prices change only marginally and quantities are essentially un-
changed. Moving from unconstrained monopoly to a duopoly with positive
trade ﬂows in a Bertrand model, on the other hand, is a discrete change. The
equilibrium with trade is signiﬁcantly more competitive than unconstrained
monopoly.
3 Competition in autarky
The market structure analyzed so far is rather special. The domestic pro-
ducer has a monopoly in autarky and the outcome without trade, accord-
ingly, does not depend on competition between producers. It could be argued
that a more typical situation is one where there is at least some competition,
also in autarky. We extend the model in the previous section and let there
8be four ﬁrms, two domestic producers (1 and 2) and two foreign producers
(3 and 4). Markets are symmetric and we again focus on the home mar-













−θb(q1q2 + q1q3 + q1q4 + q2q3 + q2q4 + q3q4)+m
where qi is the quantity of ﬁrm i’s variety and m is the utility of money.
Utility maximization subject to the budget constraint gives the following
inverse demand functions:




Re-arrange these equations to obtain the demand functions:
qi =
(1 − θ)a − (1 + 2θ)pi + θ
P
j6=i pj
(1 + 3θ)(1− θ)b
(13)
and the system of demand functions is linear in all prices. Firms maximize
proﬁts and ﬁrst order conditions can be used to derive reaction curves in
the trade equilibrium (when all four ﬁrms have positive sales in market H).
The reaction curve for a domestic ﬁrm (1 and 2) is
pi =








and for a foreign ﬁrm (3 and 4)
pi =











In Appendix B we solve for the equilibrium prices and quantities. These
equilibrium quantities can be inserted in the welfare function to ﬁnd the
welfare level for non-prohibitive trade costs.
Welfare is illustrated in Figure 3. In the ﬁgure, b b t denotes the trade costs
at which it is proﬁtable for one foreign producer to enter and b t the trade
costs at which both foreign ﬁrms will export.7 The ﬁgure shows that, for
any given trade cost, welfare is lower if products are closer substitutes. The
reason for this is that the value of product variety is low if the products are
7For ease of comparison we think of the game as a two-stage game such that welfare
equals the autarchy welfare until the point where trade actually occurs. This is not
important for any conclusions that we draw.
9close substitutes. The ﬁgure also shows that imports occur for a much wider
range of trade costs if products are distant substitutes. Competition between
distant varieties is less aggressive and leaves more room for ineﬃcient pro-
ducers (in this case more costly imports). In addition, product variety also
has an additional value for consumers and the price is consequently higher

























Figure 3. Welfare in a Bertrand oligopoly (a=2, b=1, c=0.5).
Welfare is a continuous function in t (for t<b t)a n dt h eﬁrst order
condition, W0
t =0 ,gives the minimum welfare level. The solution to the ﬁrst
order condition is unique and, in the interval of non-prohibitive trade costs,
the welfare has its minimum at
tB4
min =
3(a − c)(1− θ)(5θ +2 )
2
12θ4 +1 9 θ3 +9 1 θ2 +6 4 θ +1 2
, (16)
which is a trade equilibrium
¡
0 ≤ tB
min ≤ b tB¢









12θ4 +1 9 θ3 +9 1 θ2 +6 4 θ +1 2
¢, (17)
which is declining in product homogeneity (θ).
The lowest welfare level with trade can be compared with the welfare
level in autarky. The equilibrium autarky-prices in the domestic market are
b pB2





10and corresponding quantities are
b qB2
1 = b qB2
2 =
a − c
(θ +1 )( 2− θ)b
(19)
which can be inserted in the welfare function









− c(q1 + q2) (20)
to obtain the Bertrand welfare level in autarky
WB2 = W|
t>e e t =
(3 − 2θ)(a − c)
2
(2 − θ)
2 (θ +1 )b
. (21)
N o w ,t h ew e l f a r el e v e li na u t a r k yc a nb ec o m p a r e dw i t ht h el o w e s tw e l f a r e
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2
¡




which is continuous in θ. If products are independent or homogenous, the
quote is equal to unity and welfare levels are equal. The quote has its
maximum at θ =0 .4, where welfare with trade is higher than welfare in
autarky. The quote has a minimum at θ =0 .9 , where minimum welfare
with trade is lower than welfare in autarky. Welfare in autarky is higher than
the minimum welfare with trade, if products are suﬃciently close substitutes.
Proposition 3 Let utility be given by Eq (11) with θ ∈ (0,1).L e tﬁrms have
constant marginal costs and per unit transport cost. Assume that there is a
Bertrand duopoly in each country. Then the lowest welfare level with trade
is lower than welfare under autarky, if goods are suﬃciently close substitutes
(θ ∈ (0.76,1)).
Proof. Set the quote in Eq (22) equal to 1 and solve for critical θ,w h i c hi s
equivalent to
θ2 ¡
20 − 100θ2 +8 θ +7 2 θ3¢
=0
where θ1 = θ2 =0are two obvious roots and θ3 =1is a third root. The


















11T h eo n l yr o o ti nt h ei n t e r i o r(0,1) is θ =0 .75622. At this point the quote







= −0.06 < 0
















The analysis in this section illustrates the importance of competition in
autarky for the welfare eﬀects of trade in a Bertrand model. While more
than one domestic producer in autarky and relatively similar products, are
two necessary conditions for reciprocal dumping to possibly generate neg-
ative welfare results in a Bertrand model, neither product diﬀerentiation
nor monopoly in autarky aﬀects this conclusion in the Cournot model. The




















Figure 4. Welfare in a Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly (a=2, b=1, c=0.5)
4C o n c l u s i o n
This paper shows that trade can reduce welfare in a model with price compe-
tition and diﬀerentiated products under standard assumptions. If products
12are suﬃciently close substitutes and the autarky equilibrium is suﬃciently
competitive, welfare is higher in autarky than the lowest level with trade.
Adding more products that are close substitutes to a market with price com-
petition does not add much consumer value and prices are already close to
marginal cost due to the aggressive nature of price competition. The waste
of real resources in trade, consequently, dominates the eﬀects of competition
as well as market expansion for intermediate and high trade costs.
We focus on the possibility of trade having a negative eﬀect on welfare.
This might seem a bit odd as really the main message from our paper is that
trade is almost always welfare increasing . The question we are interested in
is if the qualiﬁcation "almost" encompasses a signiﬁcant range of parameter
values and modeling choices or not. Indeed, the details of the results will be
sensitive to how we model utility.8 On a related note the welfare eﬀects of a
greater choice of products has been a lively theme in the empirical literature
(see for instance Petrin, 2002 or Ackerberg and Rysman, 2005). Indeed,
while theoretical work is important to understand the robustness of these
welfare eﬀects we believe that empirical work will be crucial for resolving
these issues. As a start, in Friberg and Ganslandt (2005) we examine the
welfare eﬀects of moving to autarky for the Swedish bottled water market
and do not ﬁnd that trade lowers welfare on that market. While one study
is not enough to put the concerns raised by the above analysis to rest, one
may hope that additional empirical studies will examine the relevance of the
proposition that trade may lower welfare so that we get some robust ﬁndings
as to whether we should worry about this aspect of trade.
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14Appendix A
This appendix details a number omitted equations from the analysis in sec-
tion 2 and 3. A full appendix of calculations are available for downloads
at http://www.hhs.se/personal/friberg. The inverse demand functions for
variety H and F are given by:
pH = a − bqH − θbqF, (23)
pF = a − bqF − θbqH. (24)


























1 − θ2¢pF. (26)
The two ﬁrst order conditions give the unique Bertrand equilibrium (assum-
ing that the import volume is positive):
pB
H =
2a − aθ − aθ2 +2 c + cθ + tθ
4 − θ2 (27)
pB
F =
2a − aθ − aθ2 +2 c + cθ +2 t
4 − θ2 . (28)
Insert the equilibrium prices in (25) and (26) to obtain the equilibrium
quantities, denoted qB
H and qB
F . In order to ﬁn dt h eh i g h e s tt r a d ec o s ta t
which there are imports we set qB
F =0and solve for the critical threshold.




2 − θ − θ2¢
2 − θ2 . (29)
At this trade cost the unique Bertrand equilibrium is point B in Figure 1.
We ﬁrst evaluate welfare in the interior Bertrand equilibrium with trade
(points on the line between F and B). For an interior equilibrium with trade,
















We are now in a position to calculate the welfare at diﬀerent levels of
transport costs. Using the equilibrium values of prices and quantities in
Equation (30) we express equilibrium welfare as a function of parameter
15values. The resulting expression is long and unwieldy. However, we may
take advantage of the fact that we are interested in evaluating it at diﬀerent
levels of transport costs. Using particular values for the transport costs the
welfare function simpliﬁes to quite manageable expressions. Welfare with





bθ2 − bθ − 2b
+
2ac − 2c2
bθ2 − bθ − 2b
+
2ac − a2 − c2
4b − 3bθ2 + bθ3 (31)
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2
2θ4 − 9θ2 +1 2
!
(33)










2θ4 − 9θ2 +1 2
¢, (34)
which is the lowest welfare level with trade.
We proceed with the analysis for trade costs at, and above, the trade-
deterring level. Assume that the foreign ﬁrm takes sequential decisions (a
simultaneous game is analyzed next). The foreign ﬁrm ﬁrst takes a decision
to enter or stay out of market H and then, subject to entry, sets a proﬁtm a x -
imizing price in a non-cooperative fashion. The foreign ﬁrm enters market H
if the expected proﬁt in the Nash equilibrium is non-negative. Accordingly,
in the sequential game the foreign ﬁrm enters if t ≤ b t and stays out if t>b t.


















and welfare is consequently





In the simultaneous game the foreign ﬁrm takes a decision to enter or
stay out of market H and simultaneously sets a proﬁt maximizing price in a
16non-cooperative fashion. Accordingly, in the simultaneous game the home
ﬁrm must set a price such that it is unproﬁt a b l ef o rt h ef o r e i g nﬁrm to





(a(1 − θ)+c + t + θpH) (38)
and we insert this in the demand function for the foreign ﬁrm and solve for
prices such that no importation occurs, i.e. qF =0 , which yields
pH =
c + t − a(1 − θ)
θ
(39)
pF = c + t (40)
and it is obvious that the foreign ﬁrm makes no proﬁt in the home market
at these prices. The home ﬁrm’s price is an increasing function in t. This
price is above the monopoly level for very high trade costs. Consequently,
the home ﬁrm sets the autarky (monopoly) price for suﬃciently high trade
costs, i.e. trade costs above the threshold
t =
(a − c)(2− θ)
2
. (41)
In the intermediate interval, i.e. b t<t<t, welfare is
W|e t<t<t =
(a − c − t)(2aθ − a + c + t − 2cθ)
bθ2 . (42)
and welfare is a declining function in the trade cost, t. In the simultaneous
game, the welfare function is continuous at t = b t and the function is strictly
decreasing to the autarky level at t.
We not turn to the Cournot game that we examine in section 3. The





























(a − c)(2− θ)
2
, (45)
which corresponds to point A in Figure 1 with Bertrand competition. Total
















17w h i c hi sc o n t i n u o u sa n dd i ﬀerentiable in t.W es e tW0 =0and solve for t
to obtain the minimum, which is at the interior trade cost
tC2
min =
(a − c)(3+θ)(2− θ)
2
12 − θ2 . (47)
Appendix B
This appendix gives the omitted details from the analysis of the 4 ﬁrm case.
We commence with Bertrand competition. Solving the ﬁrst order conditions
simultaneously yield the unique Bertrand equilibrium (assuming that the
import volume is positive). The equilibrium price for a domestic producer


































and we insert the equilibrium prices in (13), to obtain the equilibrium quan-
































2+5 θ − θ2¢






The critical trade cost when one foreign ﬁrms ﬁnds it unproﬁtable to be
active in market H is implicitly given by qB
j (t)=0for j =3 ,4.
b tB = b tB4 =
(a − c)(5θ +2 )( 1− θ)
2+5 θ − θ2 . (52)
With only one foreign ﬁrm active in market H, the market is a triopoly (two
18domestic and one foreign ﬁrm). The unique triopoly equilibrium is



























θ2 − 3θ − 2
¢





Eventually, for a suﬃciently high trade cost, it is unproﬁtable for any foreign
ﬁrms to export to market H and the prohibitive trade cost is:
b b t
B
= b tB3 =
(a − c)(3θ +2 )( 1− θ)
2+3 θ − θ2 . (55)


















b(3θ +2 )( 2− θ)
(57)









(2 − θ)(a − c)
(2 + θ)
. (58)
Proceeding to the welfare analysis we compute total welfare for an inte-
















w h i c hi sc o n t i n u o u sa n dd i ﬀerentiable in t.W es e tW0 =0and solve for t
to obtain the minimum, which is at the interior trade cost
tC4
min =
3(θ +1 )( a − c)(2− θ)
2
12 + 16θ +3 θ2 − 3θ3 . (60)









12 + 16θ +3 θ2 − 3θ3¢ (61)
There is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the Cournot equilibrium and
the Bertrand equilibrium when two domestic ﬁrms are active. The Bertrand
equilibrium is more competitive as ﬁrms compete in prices. The unique
Cournot equilibrium, on the other hand, is
b qC






3 = b qC
4 =0 (63)
19and welfare is
WC2 = W|t>e t =
(3 + θ)(a − c)
2
b(θ +2 )
2 (64)
20